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Democratisation via elections in an African 'narco state'? 
The case of Guinea-Bissau
Dirk Kohnert 1
Abstract: Recent development cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, focussing on good 
governance, state-building and conflict prevention, did not contribute to democratization nor 
to the stabilization of volatile political, military and economic structures. Both the portrayal 
of Guinea-Bissau as failed ‘narco state' as well as Western aid meant to stabilize this state by 
multi-party elections are based on doubtful concepts and assumptions. Certainly, the impact 
of drug trafficking could endanger democratization and state-building if continued 
unchecked. However, the most pressing need is not state-building, facilitated by external aid, 
yet poorly rooted in the social and political fabric of the country, but nation-building from 
below as a pre-condition for the creation of viable state institutions. 
Keywords: democratization, elections, informal institutions, aid, nation-building, institution 
building, drug trafficking, Guinea-Bissau, Africa
JEL codes: D72, E26, N47, O17, Z1
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21. Introduction: Democratization and pacification by elections in Africa?
The quest for democratic transition has been on the agenda of African countries since the 
beginning of the second wind of change in the early 1990. Multi-party elections have been 
propagated by politicians, the global donor community and academic scholars alike as mayor 
means to promote democratic change and to stabilize so-called 'weak' or 'failed states'. The 
question, whether even flawed elections could contribute to stabilization and democratization 
has been discussed controversially. Though there seems to be a growing consensus among 
politicians and political scientists that multi-party elections matter, regardless of the quality of 
their formal procedure. Staffan Lindberg and others extend Rustows's (1970) theory that 
already democratic behaviour produce democratic values (cf. Lindberg 2006:vii; 2009). The 
learning-by-doing process of repeated elections is said to improve both stability and quality of 
democratic institutions in African countries steadily with practice (Lindberg 2006:86; 2008). 
According to Lindberg, violent breakdowns of states are most likely before and after the first 
elections, although "even first elections start to create and affect institutions, actors, and 
processes of change" (Lindberg 2006:119, 121). Contradicting hypotheses of Carothers 
(2002) and others which maintain that the focus of the international community on elections 
as means of peaceful democratic transition is misguided, have been summarily refuted
(Lindberg 2006: 119, 140). 
In my view, these theories on 'democratization by elections' – although possibly 
reflecting average trends of Africa's democratization process in the past - are based to much 
on sweeping generalizations, essentialism and exceptions to allow for meaningful prognoses 
and well founded political advice in actual country cases of 'weak states'. The latter seems to 
be influenced often by the apparent lack of feasible alternative concepts for intervention of the 
donor community, by wishful thinking, and doubtful dogmas of behavioural science. In order 
to provide sound political advice based on realistic scholarly analyses there is no other way 
than to rely on a comprehensive study of each country's history, its formal and informal 
social, political and economic institutions and networks, which should be based of course on 
established theoretical concepts and methodology. The case study of Guinea-Bissau presented 
below serves as a first step in this direction as explorative study for the generation and testing 
of alternative approaches. My hypotheses, to be tested in the following, run as follows: First, 
development aid meant to contribute to democratization and stability in African countries by 
promoting elections, regardless of their democratic quality, is misleading or even 
counterproductive. The same applies to underlying theories on the general usefulness of 
3elections mentioned above. Second, conventional concepts of 'weak' or 'failed states' are 
heavily biased in favour of global Western security interests. They are equally inappropriate 
guidelines for political action, orientated at a sustainable peaceful democratic transition. 
Third, development assistance as well as any other international or national political actors 
who aim at creating stable and democratic conditions in fragile African countries should focus 
more on bottom-up policies to create and consolidate nation-building instead of trying to 
reinforce top-down formal state structures.
2. Early elections  -  A step towards stabilisation? 
The political history of independent Guinea-Bissau (RGB) is characterized by an intimate 
merger of its military and political elite. The military has had a strong historical legitimacy in 
the view of the people over decades because of its decisive role in the liberation war. The 
army had in actual fact fought a people's war which greatly contributed to its success. The 
heroes of the liberation struggle like 'Nino' Vieira continued to be the political and military 
leaders after their victory over the Portuguese colonial powers in 1974. Yet, whereas the 
military led the people's struggle for national liberation, it gradually turned into a major factor 
in destabilizing the democratization process afterwards. Guinea’s politico-military elite 
became increasingly detached from the population, concerning both democratic legitimation 
and government revenue. Already in the late 1990s net official development aid constituted 
about half of the country's GNP (Rudebeck 2001:10-11). In addition, the search for easy 
money and reliance on external financial resources contributed to the gradual criminalization 
of state institutions and members of the power elite. First by involvement of rank and file of 
the army in weapon trafficking, notably with their neighbours in the Casamance, Southern 
Senegal (cf. ICG 2008); later-on by apparent involvement of fractions of the power elite in 
global drug cartels, as will be shown in detail further on.
Nevertheless, at the grass-roots, notably in the countryside, the villagers continued to 
be dedicated to democratization as they saw it: i.e. empowerment and a voice in the control of 
their own resources (cf. Klute et al 2008; Rudebeck 2001). Certainly, ethnicity (e.g. the 
question of Balante underrepresentation) played a significant role in the local view, notably 
because it was instrumentalized by the urban power elite for its own interest. Yet, the vision 
of the struggle of liberation, carried by ideals of solidarity, equality and multiculturalism, was 
and still is so deeply engrained in the population that the imaginary of cultural multiplicity as 
4a major base of nation-building from below still prevails (Rudebeck 2001:29; Temudo 2008); 
again this point will be engrossed by more detailed analysis in the subsequent sections.
The states' lack of integration into the socio-cultural fabric of the nascent nation was
most pronounced and visible in two spheres, which, however, were just two sides of the same 
coin: First, the fragile formal state structures inherited from colonial times, which hardly 
improved after independence (for details cf. Forrest 2003; Schiefer 2002; Klute et al. 2008). 
Second, an ‘uncaptured’ peasantry on the one side and the emergence of a stratum of poverty-
ridden urban poor on the other, created last but not least by ill-conceived neo-liberal structural 
adjustment programs of the Bretton Woods Institutions (cf. Forrest 2003; Rudebeck 2005; 
2001).
As a consequence of the growing gap between government and the people, Guinea-
Bissau has been ridden by political instability, a bloody civil war (1998-99) and numerous 
coups or coup attempts (the most recent in April 2010). In fact, there was no elected president 
in the country's history who served his full mandate (cf. EU EOM 2009:3). The actual degree 
of this instability was highlighted in the night of first to second March 2009 by the 
assassination within hours of the army chief, general Batista Tagme Na Waie, and the head of 
state, João Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira. Both, originally highly popular brothers in arms during the 
liberation war, became arch enemies later on. This most recent political crisis showed to 
which extent the Guinean state had been undermined and corrupted by longstanding internal 
feuds of the politico-military power elite, a process obviously stimulated by transnational 
networks of drug and weapon traffickers. 
In order to prevent a power vacuum, the interim government – assisted by the 
international donor community – was at pains to re-establish law and order by early 
presidential elections. The prevailing view inside and outside the country was that Guinea-
Bissau was in dire need of a functioning state2. And this not just for the good of the country 
itself. As will be shown below in more detail, the quest for stable states served at the same 
time the interest of global Western players in fighting terrorism and in installing stability in 
the entire West African sub-region, already labelled  the Pandora Box of Africa. This was one 
of the reasons why the European Union and other donors were prepared to finance and 
observe the elections, meant to legitimize the new government and the formal structures of 
democracy established with the first multi-party elections in 1994. Even so election assistance 
2 "Stressing the importance of the upcoming presidential election in Guinea-Bissau of 28 June 2009, and the 
need to have free, fair and transparent elections as a crucial and necessary step towards the full return to 
constitutional order, consolidation of democracy and national reconciliation." (UN-SC 2009b, italics DK)
5was just one out of a variety of measures of the international donor community in the last 
decade, meant to prevent the outbreak of new violent conflicts and to assure a functioning 
state, it was all the same seen as essential. This view was underlined by the expertise of 
scholars in international relations who argued that free and fair elections were vital for post-
conflict stability and development (cf. introduction and Lindberg 2009; 2006; 
Akopari/Azevedo 2007). Unfortunately, there were little if any lessons learnt from the 
outcome of previous similar measures, meant to effect a significant turnaround in Guinean 
politics. One could rightly ask whether the election, as well as its subsequent legitimation by 
several international election observation missions (UN, EU, AU, ECOWAS, UEMOA, IOF, 
etc.), was rather an electoral façade without any positive impact on institution building, in 
view of the same major political and military actors still involved in the exercise (cf. Monteiro
& Morgado 2009:2)3. Hitherto, most democratization aid for RGB has been of limited 
success: Substantial election assistance of the EU for the last legislative elections in Bissau in 
November 2008 for example had apparently little, if any positive impact on the functioning of 
the current political system. Just three month after the parliamentary elections, highly praised 
by international observers for its exemplary role in assisting democratization (cf. ICG 
2009a:5; EU-EOM 2008), the underlying politico-military conflicts culminated in the extra 
legal killings of the top ranks in political and military hierarchy of the country, accompanied 
by the continuing impunity of the perpetrators4. 
Nevertheless, the EU extended its programme of electoral assistance for the early 
presidential elections in June 2009, apparently following the motto 'business as usual'. On 
June 5, 2009, the eve of the start of the electoral campaign, further high ranking politicians, 
among them one presidential candidate, were killed, others were abducted or persecuted5. The 
3 Cf. also Issa K. Barry: 'Guinée Bissau: Pourquoi ils ont fait tomber le bonnet rouge'. L'Observateur Paalga, 
July 31, 2009 (Editorial): "Beaucoup d'observateurs de la scène politique se demandent légitimement à quoi 
servira ce passage forcé aux urnes tant qu'il n'y a pas la paix dans les cœurs. Si ce n'est à choisir le prochain 
mouton de sacrifice." 
4 However, following the attempted coup of 1 April 2010, the EU mission for the reform of the defence and 
security sector in Guinea Bissau suspended its mission on 31 May 2010. It conditioned the resumption of the 
mission to the liberation of the army head Zamora Induta, imprisoned by the insurgents in Mansoa prison, and to 
the prosecution of the coup instigators; cf. Notícias lusófonas: 'UE condiciona apois a liberação de Zamora 
Induta e a novas chefias militares'. 21 May 2010. 
5 Baciro Dabó, an independent presidential candidate, although PAIGC-member and Minister for Territorial 
Administration, was slain at his home in Bissau on the eve of the electoral campaign, allegedly because he 
attempted to resist a detention order (cf. here and in the following ICG 2009:6-7; EU-EOM preliminary report 
2009:3, 7). In the same vain, Helder Proença, former defence minister, was killed, together with two of his body 
guards. Apparently he, together with Dabó, had been accused by José Zamora Induta, the interim army chief, to 
be responsible for a coup attempt. Supposedly there were misgivings in high military circles that Dabó, a close 
ally of murdered president Vieira, would take the masterminds behind the extra-legal killings of the President 
and his army chief to task if he won the elections. A second presidential candidate, Faustino Imbalí, former 
Prime Minister, was beaten up and kidnapped by soldiers the same day. A third candidate, Pedro Infanda, leader 
6attorney general received repeated death threats (the latest in August 2009) because he tried to 
hunt down the culprits of the March killings; he dared no longer to sleep at home. Apparently 
unimpressed by this 'climate of insecurity, intimidation and fear' (EU EOM 2009:3), or 
because they thought they had no alternative, the donors, led by the UN and the EU,
continued in assisting the formal state structures by financing and supervising the early 
elections on July 28, 2009. Probably for diplomatic reasons, international election observers 
shut their eyes and attested not only a well organized, peaceful and orderly voting process, but 
judged the elections in general as 'free, fair and transparent' and as an 'important step towards 
achieving political stability and security ' (UN-SC 2009a:2, 3, 11). They mainly deplored 
general voter fatigue and the subsequent low turnout (about 60 and 61 percent of the 
electorate in the first and second round respectively, the lowest since the introduction of 
multi-party elections in 1994)67. In the second round (26 July) the candidate of the ruling 
PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde; the former socialist unity 
party) Malam Bacai Sanha, won with more than 63 percent of the votes, followed by his rival 
and former president Mohamed Kumba Yalá (candidate of the Partido para a Renovação 
Socia Social, with 37 percent; cf. EU EOM 2009; UN-SC 2009a). Yet, the question remains
whether there exist any lessons learned or alternatives to the conventional way of assistance 
for formal democratization and state-building.
At least in scholarly international discussion, the general quest for 'good governance' 
and a functioning state in Africa has been a controversial issue. Whereas the majority of 
of the Ecological Party (LIPE), withdrew already on March 23, 2009 after having been intimidated and bashed 
by soldiers. Paulo Mendonca, still another presidential candidate, demanded in vain the adjournment of the 
elections in line with constitutional stipulations which foresee a postponement if any of the candidates dies. 
However, he did not succeed, the Supreme Court rejected his request because of overriding concerns.
6 ECOWAS and AU monitors reported (like the EU-EOM) "Eleições transparentes mas com visível cansaço dos 
eleitores". However, they noted "de uma maneira geral que houve um certo cansaço dos eleitores", tendo 
acrescentado "porquê votar se a escolha será a mesma?". A União Africana (UA), com 16 observadores saudou 
igualmente um escrutínio "livre, transparente e equitativo".  (Noticias Lusofonas, 28.07.09). - Similarly, national 
radio stations in Bissau justified the low turnout with the lack of credit of the 'political class' and the lack of new 
political concepts in the view of the voters: Campanha eleitoral sem debate de ideias pode aumentar abstenção: 
"A campanha eleitoral para a segunda volta das presidenciais na Guiné-Bissau está a ser marcada pela ausência 
do debate de ideias o que pode aumentar a abstenção, referiram à agência Lusa vários directores de rádios 
guineenses. ..."Há um candidato que se sente confortável com a vitória, fazendo a leitura dos resultados da 
primeira volta, e não se dá a grandes esforços para tentar convencer o eleitorado com propostas", referiu. ...Para 
Nelo Regala, a abstenção representa igualmente que as "pessoas deixaram de acreditar na classe política". ..."É o 
cartão vermelho que o povo está a mostrar aos nossos dirigentes sobre os assassinatos que assistimos na Guiné-
Bissau." <www.noticiaslusofonas.com/>; 20.07.09).
7 "The relative high percentage of invalid votes in the 1st round (3.6 percent, DK) could be explained by the fact 
that the voting lists still included the names of the two murdered presidential candidates; votes for them counted 
as 'invalid' (cf. EU-EOM 2009 prelim report). – On general voter motivation in RGB cf. also Sangreman et al. 
2008.
7scientists, politicians and aid experts deplored the weakness of the state in many African 
countries in general and in RGB in particular, calling for the rapid installation of functioning 
state structures, others contested this view. Based on concepts of cultural African 
primordialism (cf. Chabal&Daloz 2006; Bayart et al. 1999; Reno 1998) or of the African 
'shadow state' (Ferguson 2006), followers of the latter position point to the fact that apparently 
political leaders in RGB can be replaced without effecting any political change, rendering 
Western style democratic elections increasingly inappropriate. In fact, according to these 
authors not only formal multi-party elections, but the actual state in RGB seems to be 
irrelevant to the majority of its citizens, notably in the countryside. The state lacks its basic 
functions and guarantees. It neither assures a monopoly on violence, jurisdiction and 
prosecution, nor does it provide any other tangible benefits for the people (cf. Bordonaro 
2009:36; Vigh 2009). According to this view, a political setting has evolved in RGB which 
allocates power politics not within or behind state institutions, but outside, in neo-patrimonial 
political alliances rooted in the country's troubled history as well as in trans-national social 
spaces, including global drug trafficking (cf. Bordonaro 2009:3; Monteiro&Morgado 
2009:2)8.
Unfortunately, both theoretical positions apparently cover only half of the truth, as will 
be shown in the following sections of the paper. The advocates of 'failed state' theories on the 
one hand tend to ignore both informal politics, prevailing all over West Africa, and the 
Eurocentric background of their concepts propagated as one for all solution, e.g. structural 
adjustment and formal democratization via multi-party systems and competitive elections. 
The primordialist position on the other hand (and its equivalent the post-structuralist 
imaginaire) follows uni-dimensional concepts of path dependency which tend to ignore the 
development chances provided by innovative cultural traits, last but not least that of cultural 
nationalism and the cultural base of nation-building. In the last resort they often end in 
methodological essentialism, based rather on stereotypes than on robust empirical evidence 
(cf. Meagher 2006 for a more detailed scathing critique of the latter position). Surprisingly 
enough, grass-root patriotism developed to a considerable extent even in Guinean villages or 
the diasporas of irregular migrants in European capitals (cf. Gable 2009:175-78) as we shall 
see further below.
8 "…But as the experiences of Nino Vieira and Luiz Cabral [and Kumba Yala, D.K.] showed, the main risk to 
the country’s stability came from the practice of governing outside the country’s institutional frameworks." (ICG 
2008:15).
8In my view the most pressing need is not state-building, facilitated by external aid, yet 
poorly rooted in the social and political fabric of the country, but nation-building from below 
as a pre-condition for the creation of viable state institutions. Over the past decades a new 
nationalism developed in RGB and elsewhere in Africa. It shows remarkable differences both 
in its roots and its impact, compared with that of the national independence movements, as 
has been shown in detail already elsewhere (cf. Kohnert 2009; 2008a). Contrary to the 'first' 
nationalism, the 'second' is less prone to include, tending rather to exclude populations; 
alienation, xenophobia and its political instrumentalization are its curse. The new nationalism 
has been shaped decisively by the consequences of globalisation and by the increasing 
cleavage between the poor and the rich (cf. Barry et al. 2007 on poverty and income 
distribution). Nowadays, structures of nationalism and nation-states differ more than in the 
past. Frequently, the new nationalism is rooted in populist grass-root movements which do 
not necessarily share the same interests as the ruling class or the state. This makes for its 
extraordinary political and social ambiguity and brisance. In short, nation-building is a base 
for sustainable state-building, it is basically a question of democratic sequencing. However, 
this should not be interpreted as rigid path dependency, but rather as interrelated factors which 
can reinforce one another under favourable conditions and block development under adverse 
circumstances. In any case, neither the sequence- nor a gradual- or twin-tracked simultaneous 
approach should rely too much on formal conditions of democracy, most notably 'good 
governance' and rule of law, or on other formal democratic institutions as promoted by 
Western development aid, backed by scholarly expertise (cf. Branch/Cheeseman, 2009). This 
holds particularly for the initial take-off phase. Rather it should encompass and exploit the 
wealth of endogenous socio-cultural heritage as founding stone of nation-building and 
enduring democracy, as will be explained in the final section of the paper.
3. Is Guinea-Bissau a ‘narco-state’? Drug trafficking and its impact on politics, economy 
and society 
In the past decade, West African governments were challenged by an upsurge in transnational 
drug trafficking from Latin America destined for European markets. The trafficking often 
follows already established routes of migration or of illegal international small arms trade. It 
is periodically adapted to changing requirements of camouflage, avoidance of international 
observation and persecution of transnational criminal trade. This is related, among other 
9reasons, to a gradual shift of the cocaine market from the USA to Europe, notably from 
Colombia, via Brazil and Venezuela, to Western Africa, due to higher profits for trafficking 
with Europe (cf. Bybee 2009: 6, 11-13).9 Cocaine entered European markets mainly via Spain 
and Portugal because of its long coastline and its linguistic and historic ties with Latin 
America. At least 33 tons were seized – often accidentally – on the West African route to 
Europe between 2005 and 2007 (cf. Johansen 2008: 4-5; UNODC 2007a; Mazzitelli 2007: 
1075, 1087; Labrousse et al. 2008: 10-11; UNODC 2007: 9-15)10. Almost certainly, this was 
only the tip of the iceberg. Because of its clandestine nature the trade is difficult to quantify. 
UNDOC estimated that some 40 tons, or 27 percent of cocaine consumed in Europe annually 
until 2007, was transiting West Africa (cf. Johansen 2008: 5)11. 
On 4 June 2010 the Gambian police, assisted by the UK's Serious Organized Crime 
Agency (SOCA), discovered a huge drug smuggling ring in Gambia. In a raid on a Lebanese 
timer factory 45 km outside the capital Banjul they seized 85 bags of pure cocaine, worth € 
121m, equivalent to over US $ 1 bn at street value level, besides arms and € 210.000 in cash. 
This was one of the biggest ever cocaine catchs in West Africa, according to the deputy 
director of SOCA, Neil Giles12 (cf. Gharbi 2010). It had already suspected for a long time that 
9 This is mainly due to decreasing effective demand in the USA and the depreciation of the US$ exchange rate 
relative to the Euro. “According to U.N. figures, two pounds of uncut cocaine can now fetch as much as $45,000 
on the streets of Europe, as opposed to less than half that price ($22,000) in the U.S.” (Kirschke 2008).
10
11 In 2009 it was said that cocaine trafficking through the West African region probably decreased since 2007 by 
about 50 percent. This was traced back to increasing awareness of national and international authorities and 
subsequent measures of control. However, this apparent reduction was just due to redirected deliveries, either via 
neighbouring Gambia and Guinea-Conacry (cf. UN-SC 2009a:6) or towards new lucrative transit hubs in the 
middle of nowhere in the Saharan desert as most recent evidence from Mali indicates (cf. Boisbouvier, C. "Le 
Boeing de la coke." Jeune Afrique, 22 November 2009:35). In any case, even amounts of some 20 tons (valued 
at about one billion. US$ at destination) would still have a destabilizing impact on regional security and 
economy. (UNODC 2009: 17). - Just one year later, the representative of the UN Drugs and Crime Office in 
West Africa, Alexandre Schmidt, had to admit that drug trafficking via Guinea-Bissau had resumed again on an 
unprecedented scale, apparently unchecked by Guinean security forces (cf. Notícias lusófonas (2010): Guineé 
Bissau: Tráfico de drogas voltou fortemente ao país, dizem EUA e ONU. 5 June 2010. 
12 Further 60 empty bags of cocaine were found in the hideway, indicating that this was a major redistribution 
centre of drugs, and that apparently only a fraction of the drugs trafficked had been discovered. The company, 
the Muktharr Trading Store, situated between Bonto village and Pirang in Kombo East District, Western Region 
of Gambia, was owned by a Lebanese born businessman Mukharr, a close associate of the Gambian Head of 
State, Jahya Jammeh; cf. Gibba, Bakary (2010): Major cocaine 'catch' in Gambia: Lebanese timber factory 
transformed into a cocaine zone. Freedom Newspaper Radio, June 08, 2010. – In another big haul on 28 May 
2010, seven foreign nationals, from Russia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana, were arrested because of drug 
trafficking in Liberia. Drug enforcement officials seized four tons (out of 6 tons which were planned to be 
shipped via Monrovia to the USA) of Colombian cocaine with a street value of $100-million in Monrovia,
shipped from Venezuela to Liberia for further distribution, mainly to the United States. The arrested member of
the drug ring were accused of trying to bribe high-level Liberian officials, including the son of President Ellen 
Sirleaf (who had worked as undercover agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency), to protect the trafficking
(cf. "US cocaine sting breaks up 100 million dollar Liberia plot", AFP/Breitbart@com, 1 June 2010).
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Gambia had become another safe-haven for international drug cartels from South America
and their West African counterparts, beside Guinea-Bissau. 
Whereas Nigeria and Ghana were renowned centres of drug trafficking in the 1990s, 
during the past five years Guinea-Bissau apparently became one of the hubs of cocaine trade 
in this region. Three outstanding seizures aroused the attention of international observers: In 
September 2006, the police arrested two Colombians in Bissau accused of being involved in 
trafficking 670 kg of cocaine, found at their home. Within hours after the arrest, military 
officers forced the police to hand over the confiscated drugs in order to transfer it to a 
crumbling Treasury building, were the consignment disappeared some days later. The accused 
were released on the orders of the Attorney General by the local judge without a legal 
explanation, and the case was filed.13 It was resumed one year later because of the alleged 
involvement of high ranking officers of the army and senior government officials in the 
disappearance of the drugs (cf. UNDOC 2007: 6). In April 2007, another consignment of 635 
kg was seized in a vehicle accompanied by two soldiers and a civilian. But the traffickers 
escaped with the rest believed to amount to 2.5 tons which had been landed in an abandoned 
military airstrip at Cufar near Catio in the southern parts of the country. The soldiers were 
released because they were allegedly considered as hitch-hikers who were “simply in the 
wrong place at the wrong time”, as the army spokesman Colonel Asenio Balde declared later 
on (cf. Vulliamy 2008: 4). On July 12, 2008, another clandestine plane from Venezuela 
landed at Bissau international airport and was immediately cordoned off by military 
personnel. Its cargo was loaded onto vehicles and driven to an unknown destination. The 
army again blocked any judicial investigation (cf. US-HRR 2009). 
In short, cocaine in transit had obviously been stockpiled in Guinea-Bissau on an 
increasing scale by Colombian drug cartels since 2004, apparently with the consent of and in 
close cooperation with parts of the army and high ranking politicians. Later on it was shipped 
to Europe, either by boat or overland via Morocco, or flown in by ‘mules’, i.e. couriers with 
about 0.8 kg each hidden in their stomach or luggage. Often the latter applied the so-called 
‘shotgun’ method in order to overcome law enforcement personnel at departure and 
destination. Thus in December 2006, the police at Shiphol airport, Amsterdam, detected 32 
‘mules’ in a single flight, mostly Nigerians, with cocaine from Guinea-Bissau (cf. Vulliamy 
13 For detailed accounts of these and other outstanding cases cf. Dabo (2007); Walt (2007); Pinto/Pereira (2007); 
Vulliamy/Ferrett (2008); cf. also Vincent (2007); IRIN (2007); Vernaschi (2009).
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2008: 3). In August 2007, the Guinean air force announced closer surveillance and the 
deployment of anti-aircraft artillery to some of the 88 islands of the Bijagos archipelago, 
supposed to be a hot spot of cocaine transit, in view of its remote location, the lack of 
surveillance and reports on the landing of unidentified small aircraft suspected of drug 
transporting (cf. UNDOC 2007: 9). However, high ranking officers of the armed forces 
continued to intervene in narcotics investigations conducted by the judicial police. In 2008,
the minister of justice, the attorney general and the director of the judicial police received 
death threats in response to their stance against drug trafficking (cf. US-HRR 2009: 1). José
Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, the navy chief of staff who was suspected of being involved in the 
trafficking, was suspended in August 2008 after an alleged coup attempt. He was kept under 
house arrest but subsequently escaped to neighbouring Gambia. 
The 2009 political crisis following the murders of the chief of defence staff, General 
Batista Tagme Na Wai, and of the Head of State, João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira, a few hours 
later, on March 1, 2009, was mainly due to increasing factionalism in the military. Yet, it was 
probably also linked to the surge of organised drug trafficking, in which apparently the former 
navy chief Na Tchuto, living in self-imposed exile in Gambia in view of accusations of his 
involvement in a coup attempt, had been involved, too (cf. ICG 2009: 1, 3-4). Hardly a year
later, drug cartels based in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau were once more suspected of 
involvement in another abortive coup in Bissau on 1 April 2010. Among the supposed 
instigators of the coup attempt was again former Guinean navy chief Na Tchuto. He had 
clandestinely returned from his exil in Banjul to Bissau in December 2009, taking refuge at 
the local UN mission. End of May, Na Tchuto, who had resumed apparently his position as a 
key figure in the Guinean army, was acquitted of the charge of an attempted coup in 2008 by 
a military tribunal (cf. RFI, 1 June 2010).
The ‘narco-state’: facts and fiction of a biased concept
Under these conditions, Guinea-Bissau had seemingly become the African country the most 
completely immersed in the drug trade (cf. Ellis 2009: 191). For some scholars and politicians 
it has even become the textbook example of the first African ‘narco-state’14 (cf. Kirschke, 
2008: 1; Bybee 2009; Johansen 2008: 4). State failure has been identified as the key problem 
14 A ‘narco-state’ has been defined as “’an area that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug 
cartels and where law enforcement is effectively nonexistent’, it is hard to deny that Guinea-Bissau is Africa’s 
first ‘Narco-State’.” (cf. Bybee 2009: 18). A detailed description of the structures of a ‘narco state’ is given by 
West (2006: 10-11), taking the example of Tajikistan.
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of the country. The grossly insufficient administrative and political structures which impede 
the effective control of the territory and the combat of drug trafficking endangered not only 
the peace consolidation process in Guinea-Bissau. For the US-government, other global 
players, the UN and concerned international NGOs, this posed a potential new global security 
threat, last but not least because drug money is said to be closely linked to small arms 
proliferation and to financing international terrorism.15 Organised crime, drug trafficking and 
terrorism are seen as the “new Achilles’ heel of West Africa” (cf. Andrés 2008). Hence, on 
June 25, 2008, the UN Security Council urged the government in Bissau to stop the 
trafficking and to “strengthen its international and regional cooperation to fight the narcotics 
trade and organised crime plaguing the country” (Panapress, 7 July 2008). For the 
International Crisis Group (ICG, Brussels), one of the leading Think Tanks on conflict 
analysis and prevention, state failure is the core weakness at the root of the recurrent political 
crises and the proliferation of criminal networks in Guinea-Bissau. The ICG sees a real risk 
for the country becoming a ‘narco-state’, attractive to drug barons as well as terrorist 
networks in the Maghreb.16 According to its analysis, no political leader has really tried to 
establish the necessary structures for a functioning democratic state since independence in 
1974. Yet, the ICG experts hold that only the implementation of effective state institutions 
and the regulation of political competition, no longer entrenched in the guerrilla mentality 
generated by the struggle for liberation, but built upon a functioning multiparty system, could 
end the current political crisis and provide a basis for sustainable development in Guinea-
Bissau. Consequently, ICG strongly advised the international donor community to urgently 
support efforts to consolidate democracy, reform the security sector and construct viable state 
structures (cf. ICG 2008: 1, 24; ICG 2009).
However, international endeavours to assist RGB’s democratization process, guided 
by the ‘failed’ or ‘narco-state’ concept, are likely to fail as well. An increasingly critical 
scholarly review of the concept revealed that it is heavily biased in several aspects (cf. Call 
15 According to the renowned Brooking Index of State Weakness, RGB belongs to the most vulnerable countries 
worldwide, liable to pose serious transnational security threats. In fact, the country ranks in the lowest 20 percent 
of the so-called ‘critical weak states’ (rank 18 out of 141 developing countries, placed between Burma and 
Ethiopia, (cf. Rice/Patrick 2008: 16-17)). The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy initiative ranked RGB as 27th
out of 37 states indexed as ‘failed states’ with an acute security alert in 2009 (cf. Fund for Peace 2009).
16 According to Antonio Mazzitelli, the West African representative of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 
trafficking is only part of the menace. “Certainly the major threat that drug trafficking or all other transnational 
organized crime introduces into the West African scenario at large is the possibility of hijacking and influencing 
the democratic process. […] Thanks to the enormous financial and corruptive power of this money, this is a 
major concern in a country like Guinea-Bissau.” (Latham 2009; cf. Mazzitelli 2007: 1087).
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2008; Hameiri 2007; Bøås/Jennings 2007; Groves 2008; Hagmann/Hoehne 2009). First, its 
political use is often inherently based on the global player’s perception of security. Notably 
those states (like Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia) have been labelled as ‘failed’ where the 
breakdown of formal institutions was perceived as a threat to Western security interests.17
Others with similar deficiencies (like Angola and Ivory Coast) were even assisted and hedged, 
as far as they continued to provide an enabling environment for international capital or 
hegemonic foreign policies.18 Second, the focus of the ‘failed state’ concept on state capacity, 
notably on order and security, as represented by the assumed five ‘core institutions’ of the 
state (military, police, civil service, justice and government), without due regard to other 
equally important political factors, such as equality, empowerment or human rights, 
disregards important possible tensions and trade-offs in promoting state-building (cf. Call 
2008: 1496-1497). If state reconstruction is analysed in technocratic terms, concentrating on a 
single fit-for-all remedy (namely ‘order’) for quite different illnesses, it is likely to ignore the 
political economy and social nature of state- and nation-building, as reflected in the different 
nature of regimes (cf. Hameiri 2007: 122; Call 2008: 1497-1498). 
Alternative, methodological approaches of statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa centre 
around concepts of the ‘shadow state’ (Ellis 2009: 195), of ‘para-statal institutions’ (cf. Trotha 
2000), and the (re-)emergence of non-state political orders (Klute et al. 2008:.17-19); all 
inseparably interwoven with more or less stable forms of the ‘modern’ state. Yet, only the 
latter corresponds to the generalized notion of statehood, still prevailing in Western concepts 
of ‘failed states’. The alternative concepts mentioned above refer to the particular history of 
state-building in Africa. Notably the age-old dualism between customary and colonial rule, 
reinforced by the practice of indirect rule and its repercussions to be felt up to now, 
particularly in Anglophone Africa: this implies also trans-national informal power networks 
and institutions of governance on all levels, from the district council to the state house in the 
capital. Most often these deeply rooted, but clouded political structures are hidden from 
Western politicians’ view, and accidentally from that of many scholars, too. Nevertheless, 
17 Since 2002, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there was a remarkable shift in the US National Security 
Strategy which concludes: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones.” (quoted 
by Call 2008: 1491). 
18 For detailed examples cf. Bøås/Jennings (2007).
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they are by no means a relict of the past, restricted to remote rural areas, but very much alive, 
continually transforming and inventing itself anew.19
4. Increased aid - The most promising way to turn around failed (narco) states? 
Even the introduction of multiparty democracy along with relatively strong core state 
institutions would not guarantee peace and sustainable development in RGB. Similar to the 
failure of the socialist development path, applauded and heavily assisted without avail by so-
called progressive donors in the 1980s (cf. Schiefer 2002; Kohnert 1988), democratization is 
also likely to fail if primordial informal politics are allowed to prevail unchecked. This has 
been shown even in the model case of Benin Republic, the highly praised ‘lighthouse’ of 
democratic renewal in Africa, that showed the futility of formal democratization if pursued 
within the deeply rooted and revered socio-cultural framework of patronage and rent-seeking 
(cf. Bierschenk 2009). Under these conditions, additional development assistance (ODA) in 
countries that are already highly aid-dependent as RGB20 (also called ‘aid orphans’) could be 
easily transformed into a 'sovereign rent'21 for the politico-administrative and military elite. In 
fact, Guinea’s power elite increasingly relied on sovereign rents from aid and illicit trade, e.g. 
fishery, drugs, weapons, in the past decades (cf. Schiefer 2002). Thus, in the worst case 
scenario, well-meant but ill-applied aid could exert (and probably did wield already) similar 
devastating effects on the democratization process like sovereign resource rents (including 
illicit rents from criminal networks and drug trafficking) by making patronage politics 
financially feasible and thus derailing the democratization process (cf. Collier 2006: 1484). 
Paul Collier and others, however, maintain that aid does not constitute a sovereign rent 
and therefore is not likely to have effects akin to resource rents. Therefore, they consider 
international technical assistance, closely supervised within the framework of political 
conditioning, as the most promising way to fund ‘turnarounds’ and to address the problem of 
‘failing states’ (cf. Collier 2006: 1492-1496). Yet, there is no robust proof that aid could not 
19 Cf. Klute et al. 2008; Chabal/Daloz 2006, and their critical review by Meagher 2006; Sassen 2000; and 
Schiefer 2002.
20 About 80 percent of Bissau’s state budget is derived from ODA (cf. Einarsdóttir 2007: 105). The country is 
second only to the Comoros on the list of most dependent countries worldwide, receiving on average (1970-
1999) the equivalent of almost 14 percent of GDP as aid (cf. Djankov et al. 2008: 173). 
21 For a definition cf. Collier 2006. 1484. 
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act in a way comparable to resource rents. All depends on the aims and methods of 
implementation of aid, meant to increase the empowerment of the people. Even ex ante
governance conditionality of aid utterly failed because it did not sufficiently consider the 
informal structures of the ‘shadow state’. This applies also, but not uniquely, to the case of 
RGB where aid has been misused over decades as a sovereign rent, not controlled by any 
political system of checks and balances on the part of Guinean citizens (cf. Djankov et al. 
2008; Schiefer 2002; Kohnert 1988). Although international donors’ rhetoric of aid 
conditionality stressed time and again the need to curb aid for poor performers like RGB, the 
provision of ODA continued on a substantial scale. The donor community was increasingly 
concerned about the opportunity cost of non-intervention (cf. Einarsdóttir 2007: 107-108). 
And this not just with respect to felt needs and interest of the local population, but also in 
view of Western global security and regional stability concerns (cf. above). Aid strategies 
based on these interests, focussed on rather technocratic aspects of formal institution building, 
do not necessarily have the desired impact on empowerment or democratization from below 
which is the ne plus ultra of sustainable development in Africa (cf. Crawford 2009).
Nation-building as a pre-condition of state-building?
Therefore, the international call for the building of a (strong) state in RGB (cf. ICG 2008) 
misses the point in the actual situation: As said above, the most pressing need is not state-
building without regard to its firm anchorage in society and economy, but nation-building
from below as base of duly legitimized sustainable democratic state institutions. The regime 
created and sustained by Nino Vieira was detached from the majority of the population and 
based on 'narrow power networks' faithful to the ruler (cf. Forrest 2002:261; Temudo 
2008:248). Yet, it should be underlined again: there exists no unilateral path dependency or 
sequencing. Africa’s new nationalism22 has been shaped decisively by the consequences of 
globalization (last but not least by transnational networks of drug and weapon trafficking) and 
by the increasing cleavages between the poor and the rich (cf. Dorman et al. 2007).
Nation-building is the formation of a political community and its struggle for freedom, 
justice and democracy with the ultimate end of conquering the commanding heights of state 
power as the political sovereign. Therefore, nation-building often precedes state-building. By 
the way, it is doubtful whether development or nation-building have ever been on the agenda 
22 Cf. Kohnert 2008a; 2009 for a definition of the concept of 'new nationalism' and its repercussions for the 
analysis of current development in Africa and elsewhere.
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of African states in the first place (cf. Chipkin 2007:35). Whereas nation-building was 
certainly a major point on the agenda of Amilcar Cabral and Guinea’s liberation movement in 
the early 1970s, it was surely not one of the priorities of the subsequent heads of states in 
Bissau. Nevertheless, quite independently from official politics, new national identities, 
including a common Creole language and a truly national Guinean culture, developed from 
below in RGB (cf. Mourao 2009: 95-100; Augel 2007; Rudebeck 2001; Augel/Cardoso 
1996). The Guinean people still share a basic feeling of national identity, reinforced by the 
armed struggle against colonial domination, and based on a common and unifying tradition, 
including shared language, culture, custom and religion, in short the basic cultural 
infrastructure of belonging to a nation (cf. Chipkin 2007:200-205; Rudebeck 2001). 
However, the political history of citizenship is closely and increasingly linked with 
accelerated mobility and migration enforced by globalisation. This provides also the base for 
counteracting 'politics of belonging', instrumentalized by particular political elites to their own 
advantage. There are several examples from other African countries, as shown by the 
recurrent outbursts of xenophobia in South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere. Bissau is 
certainly not spared from this risk, as the rancour against bi-national Capverdians after 
independence, or more recent cleavages between Gambian and Senegalese petty traders and 
their Guinean counterparts demonstrated. States may even entirely collapse without 
disappearing as nations from the social imaginary, as Crawford Young rightly observed in his 
theoretical contribution to a reader edited by Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent 
(2007:241). 
5. Conclusions: Guinea-Bissau in need of nation-building from below as base of the 
reconciliation of the warring factions of the urban power elite
A reorientation of aid and transnational norm-building networks aiming at empowerment of 
the people could have considerable impact on nation building and reconciliation of warring 
factions of the political and military elite in Bissau. However, increased technical assistance 
of the international donor community does not necessarily foster the required turnaround. To 
be sustainable, aid needs to be not just massive, rapid and effective. It requires a reorientation 
of overall aims of development assistance in RGB. Global concerns about stability and 
security should be outbalanced against the pressing need of nation-building by bottom-up 
democratization and integration of cherished informal political and economic institutions into 
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an essentially revised state structure. A piecemeal but painstaking democratization of the 
fabric of informal politics, including chieftaincy and a meaningful decentralization policy 
from below (cf. Crawford 2009; Klute et al 2008), would be required to lay a sustainable base 
for a functioning democracy at the grass-root level, which could eventually lead to a more 
responsive government. In short, there is nothing which could replace political struggle for 
real democracy from below.
As Lars Rudebeck (2001) aptly summarised in his study on democracy's sustainability
in RGB, more complex power structures need to be addressed, far beyond the multi-party 
system and conventional election procedures. In this respect a Sovereign National 
Conference, following the Benin model (cf. Adamon 1995; Banégas 1995; Heilbrunn 1993), 
could serve as ignition point of a true democratization process concerning its substantial and 
innovative social and political impetus to empowerment.23 However, this would hold only if 
the political class and civil society institutions in Bissau take all necessary precautions to 
avoid the salient negative aftermath of the betrayal of the results of the Sovereign National 
Conferences in Lomé by the ruling class in the 1990s (cf. Nwajiaku 1994). Due consideration 
should be paid also to the lessons learned from a similar but less sustainable Guinean exercise 
of a National Conference after the civil war in 1999. In this respect, the most recent 
endeavour of the Guinean Parliament, backed by the UN, the National Institute of Studies and 
Research (INEP, Bissau) and the Portuguese branch of the international NGO Interpeace 
(Aliança Internacional para a Consolidação da Paz) to create civic peace initiatives (Voz di 
Paz, created in 2007)24, and to convey a National Conference of Reconciliation, could be a 
step in the right direction. On its agenda are the identification of the causes of conflicts in 
RGB, the contradictions between state and civic institutions, and conflict prevention 
strategies. Besides representatives from various government departments, civic and religious 
organisations, veterans, women, youth and the media are meant to participate, too (cf. UN-SC 
2009a: 2, 11). However, the National Conference as outlined above, apparently will not be 
sovereign, and therefore risks to end as futile as innumerable other eloquent but aloof top 
23 A Sovereign National Conference as a basis for meaningful democratization and stabilization should not be 
confused with the pledges to install a “national conference” by established political leaders, issued for example 
by the acting president Malam Bacai Sanhá of the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo 
Verde (PAIGC) in the election campaign of the presidential elections of 2009 (cf. resolutions and demands of the 
Conferência Nacional de Diálogo, Bissau, 25 to 26 May 2009 (Lusa, 26.05.09; ‘Declaração de Bissau’). The 
latter runs the risk of rather serving to consolidate established political structures, as demonstrated by similar 
events in the history of independent RGB.
24 For details cf. website: www.interpeace.org/index.php/Guinea-Bissau/Impact/Results.html; 02.12.09
18
down measures for democratic transition or reconciliation in the history of independent 
Guinea-Bissau.
Yet, a successful take-off would require not just 'good governance' in the sense of 
international donors concerns, but also the incorporation of democratic discourse and 
institutions at the local level. In order to be sustainable, this must be accompanied by 
substantial economic improvements in the livelihood of ordinary citizens25. Democratization 
alone will not satisfy the basic needs of the people; as there is no guarantee that it will lead 
automatically to pro-poor economic growth (cf. Robinson 1994:610).26 Altogether, the 
proposed new focus of aid and national politics would probably be more efficient to install 
enduring peace, security and democratization than the pursuit of multiparty democracy and 
formal institution-building by foreign aid, without due regard to the underlying informal 
political setting and its vested hidden interests. This is not to say that economic post-conflict 
recovery strategies would be useless. Yet, they make sense only as complementary measures, 
and they should differ from standard approaches of economic development and poverty 
reduction in that they give a premium to reintegration of ex-combatants, job creation for 
young men, and deep cuts in military spending (cf. Collier 2009).
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